Argument: Critical Thinking, Logic, and the Fallacies, by John Woods, Andrew Irvine, Douglas Walton

, , Comments Off on Argument: Critical Thinking, Logic, and the Fallacies, by John Woods, Andrew Irvine, Douglas Walton

By John Woods, Andrew Irvine, Douglas Walton

This textual content is designed for the serious pondering and common sense classes present in philosophy and normal schooling departments at either universities and colleges.

The most original function of the textual content is its good beginning in common sense. The dialogue of fallacies is built-in with good judgment in a fashion no longer noticeable in different texts. This remedy presents scholars with instruments to guage their very own and different peoples considering logically in addition to examine and investigate an argument.

Show description

Read Online or Download Argument: Critical Thinking, Logic, and the Fallacies, Second Canadian Edition PDF

Best logic & language books

Philosophical Theories of Probability

This booklet offers a complete and systematic account of a number of the philosophical theories of likelihood and explains how they're comparable. It covers the classical, logical, subjective, frequency, and propensity perspectives. Donald Gillies even offers a brand new idea of likelihood -the intersubjective-a improvement of the subjective concept.

The Logical Structure of the World and Pseudoproblems in Philosophy (Open Court Classics)

To be had for the 1st time in twenty years, listed here are vital works from the Twenties via the best-known consultant of the Vienna Circle. within the Logical constitution of the realm, Carnap adopts the location of “methodological solipsism” and exhibits that it really is attainable to explain the area from the quick facts of expertise.

Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations (S U N Y Series in Philosophy)

An inventive and interesting exposition of topics from Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, this e-book is helping readers locate their means round the "forest of feedback" that make up this vintage. Chapters on language, brain, colour, quantity, God, price, and philosophy increase a big topic: that there are numerous different types of language use--a kind philosophy must examine yet has a tendency to miss.

The Boundary Stones of Thought: An Essay in the Philosophy of Logic

The Boundary Stones of proposal seeks to safeguard classical common sense from a couple of assaults of a generally anti-realist personality. Ian Rumfitt is sympathetic to some of the premisses underlying those assaults. certainly, he regards a few of them as powerful demanding situations to definite rules of classical semantics, significantly the primary of Bivalence.

Additional info for Argument: Critical Thinking, Logic, and the Fallacies, Second Canadian Edition

Sample text

Hume tells us “that we assent to our faculties, and employ our reason only because we 12 Thomas Reid, Inquiry and Essays, p. 4. , p. 85. xml CY402/Lemos 0521837847 May 4, 2004 1:10 cannot help it. ”15 Strawson agrees with Hume in this assessment of our basic “framework” beliefs – for example, beliefs in the existence of bodies, other people, and a determinate past. Such framework beliefs are “unavoidable natural convictions, commitments or prejudices, . . ”16 From the claim that these framework beliefs are ineradicable, Strawson draws the following moral for dealing with skeptical arguments, one he finds already in Hume: According to Hume the naturalist, skeptical arguments are not to be met with argument.

Suppose such reflection supports the view that reliable faculties are necessary for knowledge. But now consider the position of one who accepts (1) I know that I have perceptual knowledge, (2) I know that I have perceptual knowledge only if perception is reliable, and (3) I do not know whether perception is reliable. The common sense philosopher and most of those not skeptical about perception will accept (1). Philosophical reflection on the nature of knowledge might convince us that (2) is true.

Even if we do not take our philosophical views as more likely to be true, or see our common sense beliefs as ineradicable prejudice, could we not simply recognize the inconsistency, continue to hold our philosophical views, and hope that further reflection will remove the impasse? “But,” one might object, “even if we cannot give up various common sense beliefs, could we not accept certain philosophical views because accepting them brings us greater overall coherence? Even if some set of irresistible beliefs form a consistent set of beliefs, we might adopt a philosophical theory T because of the greater coherence it brings to our views.

Download PDF sample

Rated 4.86 of 5 – based on 45 votes